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EQUALITY UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
PROTECTING NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS
PRACTICES ON PUBLIC LANDS
Fred Unmack
I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids
Congress from making any law "respecting an establishment of [a]
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' Like all United States
citizens, Native Americans are guaranteed the right to practice their
religions free from governmental interference. Yet not until the recent
decision in Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peter-
son' has a Native American site-specific religion received the protection
afforded by the First Amendment. In Northwest Indian, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of a permanent injunction
barring completion of a road through a northern California national forest.
The court found the road would violate the religious freedom of the Yurok,
Karok and Tolowa Tribes whose members used the area for religious
purposes. This case is noteworthy not only because it is the first case in
which a Native American religious freedom claim has prevailed against
the federal government, but also because it illustrates that traditional First
Amendment analysis remains an appropriate means of resolving such
claims.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Traditionally, courts have applied the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment to protect religious beliefs and practices.3 Native
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), aft'gbut modifyingonreh'g, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), aft'g
565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 55 U.S.L.W. 3741 (U.S. May 5, 1987)(No. 86-1013). The Ninth Circuit addressed
several issues besides First Amendment protedtion of Native American site-specific religions practiced
on public land, see infra note 46, but the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari solely to
address the First Amendment issue.
3. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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American religions differ from other religions in that their practitioners
often require the use of specific natural sites to discover personal truth and
power.' Conflicts may arise when a particular religious site is located on
public land. If the sanctified and pristine nature of the site is essential for
the successful completion of the religious ceremony, then any governmen-
tal decision authorizing development of the site may burden the religious
practice.
Past federal public land policy often abridged Native American
religious practices when land use conflicts arose.' In an effort to reverse
that policy, Congress passed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
of 1978 (AIRFA).6 AIRFA acknowledged the past inequities of federal
policy and directed federal agencies to protect and preserve Native
American religious practices in future planning decisions. Significantly,
AIRFA explicitly recognized that the First Amendment guaranteed
religious freedom to Native Americans.7 Concurrently with the new policy
directives announced in AIRFA, Native Americans began asserting First
Amendment claims against federal agencies whose actions impaired the
practice of Native American religions on public lands.
The first claim to surface in a federal circuit court of appeals was
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority.8 The Cherokee Nation alleged
its religious uses of the Little Tennessee River valley would be destroyed by
the flooding behind Tellico Dam.9 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit used the Free Exercise Clause test developed by the United States
Supreme Court to resolve the issue. Under that test, a complainant must
prove the existence of a legitimate religion and that the government's
action will burden the religious practice. 10 Once the complainant proves
such an abridgement, the burden of proof shifts to the government to show
a compelling interest for the action which cannot be achieved by less
burdensome means. 1 In Sequoyah, the court found the existence of a
4. FEDERAL AGENCIES TASK FORCE, AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT 10
(1979).
5. id. at 5.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982).
7. Several complainants have asserted claims under AIRFA, but federal courts have held that
AIRFA is a statement of federal policy and not grounds for a cause of action. Any claim for an
infringement of a religious belief or practice must be asserted under the First Amendment. Badoni v.
Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 180(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Wilson v. Block, 708
F.2d 735, 747 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
8. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
9. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1160.
10. The United States Supreme Court has defined a "burden" as a "coercive effect [that]...
operates against [the practitioner] in the practice of his religion." School Dist. ofAbington Township,
374 U.S. at 223.
II. The compelling interest must be an interest of the "highest order." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
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Cherokee religion, but also found that practice of the religion did not
require the use of the Little Tennessee River valley. 12 The court stated the
site must be central to the religious practices of the Cherokee Nation in
order to establish a First Amendment claim.13 This requirement com-
ported with the principle enunciated by the United States Supreme Court
in earlier First Amendment cases that a religion must represent the shared
convictions of a group to qualify for protection under the First Amend-
ment. "' Since the Cherokee Nation could not prove the necessary connec-
tion between its religion and the valley, the Sixth Circuit denied the First
Amendment claim.15
The Navajo and Hopi Tribes raised the First Amendment in Wilson v.
Block.16 There, the United States Forest Service authorized the expansion
of an existing ski area in the San Francisco Peaks of Arizona which
encroached on land used by the Tribes for religious purposes.17 The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found religious use by the
Tribes of the entire San Francisco Peaks, but did not find the disputed area
of expansion to be essential to the Tribes' religious practices;"8 the same
religious ceremonies performed in the affected area could be done
elsewhere on the San Francisco Peaks.' 9 Therefore, the court held the site
was not central to the Tribes' religions and denial of religious use of the
area would not violate their First Amendment rights.2
The Navajo and Hopi Indians also argued that disturbances from the
ski area would burden religious practices performed in other locations on
the Peaks.2 The court dismissed this claim, noting that for forty years the
skiing facility had operated with no evidence of any prior interference with
the Tribes' religious practices. 2  The Navajo and Hopi Indians failed to
prove how expansion would alter this situation and lead to new sources of
interference.
In Crow v. Gullet,23 the Lakota and Tsistsistas Nations alleged the
temporary disruption of access to religious sites at Bear Butte in South
Dakota during construction of a parking lot and other facilities interfered
12. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1163.
13. Id. at 1164.
14. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216.
15. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1165.
16. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
17. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740.
18. Id. at 744.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 745.
21. Id. at 744.
22. Id. at 745.
23. 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), affid, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983).
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with their religious practices.24 The State of South Dakota expressly
created a park at Bear Butte to facilitate the practice of Native American
religion. The construction work was intended to improve usage of the park.
The federal district court for the District of South Dakota viewed the
construction as a disturbance but not as a "burden" for First Amendment
purposes.25 This finding would normally conclude the First Amendment
analysis. However, the district court still applied the second part of the
Free Exercise Clause test and searched for evidence of a compelling
governmental interest. Balancing the interference against the interest, the
court found the government's interest sufficient to justify the slight
infringement on the religious practices of the Lakota and Tsistsistas
Nations.2" Therefore, the First Amendment did not bar completion of the
construction work.
The most thorough analysis of a Native American religious freedom
claim is found in Badoni v. Higginson.2 7 In Badoni, the Navajo Tribe
claimed the waters behind Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River would
inundate religious sites along the riverbed and would indirectly disrupt
religious practices at another religious site, Rainbow Bridge, by providing
easier access for tourists.2 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
found a system of sincerely held beliefs sufficient to satisfy the definition of
a religion and recognized the centrality of the sites to the Navajo religion.29
Without determining whether the religious practices were in fact bur-
dened, the Tenth Circuit found that any burden was justified by the
government's compelling interest.30 The federal government had spent
millions of dollars on Glen Canyon Dam, the dam could not feasibly have
been relocated elsewhere, and large revenue losses would have resulted had
the dam not been filled to capacity. Furthermore, the government was
unable to achieve its goal of flood protection and electrical generation by
any means other than a dam. Although the religious practices of the Tribe
may have been burdened, the government's interest outweighed that
burden and the Navajo Tribe's First Amendment claim was denied.3 1
Unlike courts in previous First Amendment cases brought by Native
Americans, the Tenth Circuit in Badoni also examined the tension between
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. The Navajo Tribe
requested governmental regulation of tourist access to the Rainbow Bridge
24. Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 788.
25. Id. at 791.
26. Id. at 792.
27. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
28. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 176.
29. Id. at 177.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 180.
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religious site to reduce the intrusions on tribal members practicing
religious ceremonies.32 The government argued and the court agreed that
managing the area for the benefit of specific religious users violated the
Establishment Clause, since such management did not have a secular
purpose.33 Thus, the First Amendment prohibited the government from
mitigating the interference it caused.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment requires the
government to accommodate a Native American site-specific religion
unless the government proves a compelling interest. The Establishment
Clause, however, prohibits the government from preferring one religion to
another. In Northwest Indian, the parties addressed both conflicts inherent
in the First Amendment: the tension between a burden and a compelling
interest and the tension between an accommodation and preferential
treatment.
III. CASE HISTORY
The controversy in Northwest Indian centered on the United States
Forest Service's proposal to rebuild and pave the seventy-five miles long
Gasquet-Orleans (G-O) road."' The final six miles of the road, known as
the Chimney Rock Section, lay within the 76,500 acre Blue Creek Unit of
the Six Rivers National Forest in northern California. The existing road
in this section remained unpaved and generally fit for four-wheel drive
vehicles from June through October.36 In 1977, the Forest Service issued a
draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) that proposed alternative
routes for the G-O road in the Chimney Rock section.3 After evaluating
the environmental and cultural impacts of the G-O road, the Forest Service
chose its preferred route and issued its final EIS in 1982.38 In a separate
planning process, the Forest Service drafted an EIS to cover its manage-
ment plan for the Blue Creek Unit. That plan proposed harvesting 733
million board feet of timber from the Blue Creek Unit over an eighty year
period."'
The proposed route of the G-O road was to traverse an area known to
the local Native Americans as the "high country,"' 0 which consisted of
32. Id. at 178.
33. Id. at 179.
34. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 689.
35. Id. at 690.
36. D. THEODORATUS, CULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY ROCK SECTION, GASQUET-
ORLEANS ROAD, Six RIVERS NATIONAL FOREST 1 (1979).
37. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 690.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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virgin country flanked by two roadless areas.4' The Yurok, Karok and
Tolowa Tribes used certain sites within the high country for religious
practices but needed the pristine nature of the entire area to complete
successfully their ceremonies.42
In an administrative appeal to the Forest Service, the Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Association (Association) 4" claimed both the
proposed road and the proposed logging would burden the religious
practices of the Tribes. After exhausting administrative remedies, the
Association sought a preliminary injunction in the federal district court for
the Northern District of California.44 The district court denied a prelimi-
nary injunction,45 but after a trial on the merits,48 held the proposed
construction of the G-O road violated the First Amendment rights of the
Native Americans.47 The court then permanently enjoined the Forest
Service from completing the G-O road. The Forest Service appealed the
district court's decision to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted the California
Wilderness Act of 1984.48 This Act placed most, but not all, of the high
country into wilderness classification.' 9 Specifically excluded from the Act
was a 1200 foot wide corridor through the wilderness, ostensibly for the
route of the G-O road. 50 The Act rendered the issue of logging the high
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. The seven organizations comprising the Association were the Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association, the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, California Trout, the Siskiyou
Mountains Resource Council, the Redwood Region Audubon Society, and the Northcoast Environ-
mental Center. Northwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at 590.
44. Four individuals of Native American heritage and two Sierra Club members joined the suit.
The state of California brought a separate action against the federal government through its Native
American Heritage Commission and the actions were consolidated for trial. Id. at 589-90.
45. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 552 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal.
1982).
46. The Association alleged the Forest Service violated: (]) the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution, (2) the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (AI RFA), 42 U.S.C. §
1996 (1982), (3) the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985), (4) the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985), (5) the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. I11 1985),
(6) the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act (MUSY), 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1982), (7) the National
Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985), (8) the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982), and (9) the government's trust
responsibility to protect the water and fishing rights reserved to the Native Americans on the Hoopa
Valley Indian Reservation. Northwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at 590.
47. The district court also found the Forest Service violated the N EPA, the FWPCA, the APA,
the Wilderness Act, and the government's trust responsibility to protect the Native Americans'
reserved water and fishing rights on the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation. Id. at 591.
48. California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619.
49. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 691.
50. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not find clear Congressional intent
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country less significant since logging and mining were prohibited within
the wilderness boundary.
IV. THE COURT'S REASONING
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding. In doing so, it
relied heavily on the Theodoratus Report,51 the compilation of which had
been authorized by the Forest Service. The purpose of the Report was to
gather ethnographical information as part of the forest planning process.52
The Theodoratus Report identified the ethnography of the Yurok, Karok
and Tolowa Tribes as being an "on-going indigenous religious system" that
incorporated "elements of daily life, ritual practice, geographic locale, and
ideas of origin and World Renewal.153 In addition to using specific sites for
specific religious purposes, tribal religious practitioners utilized the entire
high country for their religious training and experience.5 The Report
concluded the privacy, silence, and undisturbed natural setting of the high
country provided the most important qualities for successful religious
use.55 The district court accepted the Report's findings to prove the
presence of a legitimate religion that utilized specific sites,56 and the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed that the high country was central
to the Tribes' religious practices.57
The district court also accepted the conclusion of the Theodoratus
Report that the impacts caused by any proposed route of the G-O road and
by the logging, mining, and recreating activities that would follow from the
completion of the road would be "potentially destructive of the very core of
Northwest [Indian] religious beliefs and practices. 158 The Ninth Circuit
noted the intervening passage of the California Wilderness Act lessened
the potential impacts from logging and mining activities, but found the
"geographic and design features of the Road [sic] itself" would interfere
with the visual and aural qualities necessary for the practice of the
religion. 9 Indeed, the court found this interference "would virtually
destroy the plaintiff Indians' ability to practice their religion."60
This conclusion shifted the burden of proof to the Forest Service to
mandating completion of the G-O road through the corridor. Id.
51. D. THEODORATUS, supra note 36.
52. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 693.
53. D. THEODORATUS, supra note 36, at 105.
54. Id. at 415.
55. Id. at 105.
56. The Forest Service conceded the Yurok, Karok and Tolowa Tribes used the high country for
religious purposes. Northwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at 594.
57. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 692.
58. Northwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at 595 (quoting D. THEODORATUS, supra note 36, at 420).
59. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 693.
60. Id.
1987]
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show a compelling interest which could not be achieved in a less burden-
some manner. But instead of proving its compelling interest to complete the
G-O road, the Forest Service argued that the court should defer to the
"judgment of the Secretary [of Agriculture] as to the proper purposes and
management of the National Forest in light of the generality of congres-
sional discretion over the uses of the Forests."'" By "urg[ing] its preroga-
tive to manage its forest in the usual way," the Forest Service failed to
argue the basic constitutional question and the court dismissed this
argument as "yield[ing] nothing to the free exercise clause."" 2
The Forest Service did offer some evidence of a compelling interest by
arguing that the G-O road would increase employment in the area, would
make forest management functions easier, and would give the public
greater recreational access to the area."3 The Ninth Circuit compared this
interest to the interest found to be compelling in Badoni. In the Badoni
decision, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found the magnitude
of the Glen Canyon Dam project justified the destruction of the Navajo
religious sites.64 In Northwest Indian, the Ninth Circuit found the religious
practices of the Yurok, Karok and Tolowa Tribes would also be destroyed
if the G-O road were completed. The court, therefore, required an interest
as compelling as Glen Canyon Dam. The court concluded the Forest
Service's reasons fell "short of demonstrating the compelling interest
required to justify its proposed interference with the Indian plaintiffs' free
exercise rights." 5
The Forest Service countered by arguing that protecting the high
country as a religious preserve violated the Establishment Clause.66 The
Ninth Circuit, however, did not perceive the district court's injunction as
creating a religious preserve. The court noted the Forest Service remained
"free to administer the high country for all other designated purposes
including outdoor recreation, range, watershed, wildlife and fish habitat
and wilderness."6 7 Managing the high country for a variety of uses evinced
a policy of neutrality and followed the intent of AIRFA.68 Furthermore,
the injunction merely prohibited the government from acting. Unlike the
Badoni case, where the Navajo Tribe wanted the federal government to
regulate access to religious sites for the specific benefit of tribal religious
61. Id. at 694.
62. Id. at 695.
63. Id.
64. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 177.
65. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 695.
66. Id. at 694.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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practitioners, 9 the injunction imposed by the district court in Northwest
Indian did not require the Forest Service to police the area. The remedy
granted to rectify the government's 'violation of the Tribes' free exercise
rights did not amount to a violation of the Establishment Clause. 0
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the permanent injunction prohibit-
ing completion of the G-O road.
The dissenting opinion claimed the Theodoratus Report focused on
five side effects of the G-O road, none of which justified the imposition of a
permanent injunction.7 1 The impacts caused by construction and manage-
ment activities did not support issuance of a permanent injunction, and the
impacts caused by logging, mining and recreating were distinct from the
road and could be separately enjoined. The dissent concluded that certain
activities could be permanently enjoined, but completion of the road itself
should not be enjoined.72
The dissent also noted that only small parcels within the high country
remained open for development. Since the district court did not make
findings on the indirect impacts of development in those localized areas, the
dissent suggested the case be remanded for further factual findings on this
issue.73
The dissenting opinion further urged a reconsideration of the govern-
ment's compelling interest. The dissent claimed "[t]he government's
interest in putting public lands to productive use must be weighed carefully
S. ." and the examination should include the government's interest in
achieving economic benefits. According to the dissenting opinion, the
district court failed to give "proper respect to the government's ownership
rights in public lands."' 5
V. ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remarked in Northwest
Indian that the Free Exercise Clause test was "strained" when applied to
Native American site-specific religions,7 8 but the court's application of the
test belied that comment. The first step of the test required the Association
to prove the existence of a religious practice and that the site on public land
was central and indispensable to the practice. Although this "centrality"
requirement is viewed by some as a virtually insurmountable hurdle for
69. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 178.
70. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 694.
71. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 701 (Beezer, C.J., dissenting in part).
72. Id. at 703.
73. Id. at 704.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 695.
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complainants seeking protection of site-specific religions," the require-
ment flows directly from the United States Supreme Court's concern to
protect only legitimate religious beliefs and practices.78 Native Americans
practicing site-specific religions should not be exempt from the "central-
ity" requirement. Like other religious practitioners who claim an abridge-
ment of essential religious practices, Native American religious practition-
ers should be required to show the natural environment at issue is unique
and essential to a valid religious practice. This requirement ensures that
mere personal preferences for certain natural sites do not receive First
Amendment protection. The Ninth Circuit in Northwest Indian properly
adhered to the requirement that specific sites be central to the Native
Americans' religious practices.
In Northwest Indian, however, the existence of a religion and the
centrality of the site were not at issue. The central issue was the magnitude
of the burden of road development on the religious practices of the Yurok,
Karok and Tolowa Tribes. This latter question became a tangled issue after
passage of the California Wilderness Act. The district court, relying on the
findings of the Theodoratus Report, concluded that construction of the G-
O road would be "potentially destructive of the very core" of the Tribes'
religion.79 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found sufficient
support in the record to affirm that conclusion.8" However, as the court
noted, the intervening passage of the California Wilderness Act severely
curtailed the possible indirect impacts of the road caused by mining and
logging.81
The Theodoratus Report considered the direct impacts caused by the
proposed G-O road and the indirect impacts caused by the logging and
mining activities that would follow completion of the road. The Report
concluded that "the road itself will generate direct impacts. . .[but] it is
those activities which potentially follow from the completion of the road
which must be considered as having the greatest potential impact." 82 In
rejecting all proposed routes for the G-O road, the Report concluded the
direct and indirect impacts combined would irreparably damage the
Tribes' religious practices.83
The Ninth Circuit accepted the Report's conclusion without distin-
guishing between the Theodoratus Report's factual findings and its
77. See Comment, Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peterson: Indian
Religious Sites Prevail Over Public Land Development, 62 NOTRE DAME L.J. 125 (1986).
78. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216.
79. Northwest Indian, 565 F. Supp. at 595.
80. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 692.
81. Id. at 692-93.
82. D. THEODORATUS, supra note 36, at 417.
83. Id. at 422.
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conclusion. 84 Since the indirect impacts from the G-O road were mini-
mized by passage of the California Wilderness Act, the court's reliance on
the Report's conclusion was misplaced. As the dissenting opinion noted,
"[i]t is not clear whether the district court would have issued an
injunction" based upon the remaining possible indirect impacts. 85
While the Ninth Circuit had no evidence before it which actually
showed the extent of the interference caused directly by the G-O road or by
the remaining indirect impacts, it did examine evidence from the The-
odoratus Report suggesting the G-O road itself would interfere with the
Tribes' religious practices.8" Moreover, the Forest Service, by proposing
ten steps to mitigate impacts caused by the road, admitted the G-O road
interfered with the Tribes' religious practices.8s The Ninth Circuit
concluded such interference would have prevented the Tribes from
performing their religious ceremonies. 88 Thus, the court correctly held the
Tribes' religious practices were still burdened for First Amendment
purposes even after passage of the California Wilderness Act.
Even though the burden on the religious practices may have lessened
following passage of the Act, the existence of a burden required the Forest
Service to prove a compelling interest of the "highest order."89 In previous
Native American site-specific religion cases, only the Tenth Circuit in the
Badoni decision found a compelling governmental interest, i.e., the
completion of Glen Canyon Dam.90 Conversely, the federal district court in
Crow found the state justified to complete the construction work at Bear
Butte.91 But that court did not find a burden on the Native Americans'
religious practices, so its finding of a compelling interest was an incorrect
application of the First Amendment analysis.
In Northwest Indian, the Forest Service argued certain economic
gains might be achieved by completing the G-O road.92 The Ninth Circuit
correctly dismissed that argument as falling far short of a compelling
interest. Moreover, the Forest Service failed to show why these economic
gains could not be achieved in a less burdensome manner. Finally, the
Forest Service weakened its argument severely by insisting completion of
the G-0 road was purely a matter of agency discretion rather than a
constitutional dispute. Since the Association had presented a primafacie
84. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 693.
85. Id. at 704.
86. Id. at 693.
87. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 703.
88. Id. at 693.
89. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
90. Badoni 638 F.2d at 177.
91. Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 792.
92. Northwest Indian, 795 F.2d at 695.
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case showing a burden, the court could only choose to affirm the injunction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Northwest Indian decision underscores the recent burgeoning
awareness of Native American site-specific religious rights. Not only does
the decision protect a Native American religion from coercive governmen-
tal land management actions, it does so by means of traditional First
Amendment analysis. While the burden of proof remains high on Native
American religious practitioners, the Northwest Indian decision shows
that Native American religions can be treated equally with other religions
under the First Amendment.
